Research

Anti-Corruption Action

Our research uses public records, trade data and investigative methods to document the networks, supply chains and money behind corruption. We give our findings to the governments, prosecutors and journalists who can act on them. And we publish them here.

Released April 30, 2026

The Dekleptocracy Project

Vulnerabilities in the Russian Chemical Industry

Andrew Fink · February 2026 · 55 pages

Modern industry depends on specialty chemicals, products that are usually overlooked. Russia cannot produce many of the chemicals essential to its industrial base and has been dependent on a small number of foreign suppliers, many of which remain unsanctioned.

This 55-page report, produced for the Dekleptocracy Project, identifies critical chokepoints in Russia's chemical supply chain. Russia cannot manufacture the chemical necessary to produce industrial lubricants, which engines, rail, turbines and assembly lines all require. Its entire supply comes from a single Chinese company that remains unsanctioned. Russia also cannot manufacture the catalyst necessary to crack petroleum molecules and refine crude oil, importing its entire supply from one Indian company.

The study was provided to multiple Western governments this winter and is being released publicly today. It covers vulnerabilities across rubber and tire production, oil refining catalysts, lubricant additives, and the activities of Russian chemical trading companies that serve as intermediaries for sanctions evasion.

Key Findings

01/There are key vulnerabilities in the Russian chemical sector related to rubber, refining, lubricants, and plastics production, among others.

02/Most Russian enterprises that previously relied on chemical inputs from Europe, America, or other countries that support Ukraine have switched to Chinese providers. China appears to be able to replace almost any chemical industry input from Europe or North America, with some important exceptions.

03/Russia has serious vulnerabilities in its rubber and tire production sector, mostly related to the supply of vulcanization accelerator and anti-scorching chemicals. The Italian company Pirelli still plays an important role in Russian rubber and tire production, and a Pirelli-owned factory may be currently producing or assisting in the production of tires for the Russian military.

04/The Bashkir Soda Company, a major Russian chemical enterprise involved in Russian military production, is continuing to import European chemical inputs via the UAE.

05/Starting in late December 2023, Russia has been manipulating its import data related to catalysts, progressively shutting off information before totally cutting off information from bills of lading in October 2024.

06/Russia is dependent on exporters in India and China for catalysts related to oil refining.

07/The Russian state is aware of its weaknesses in the chemical industry and launched a national-level project in 2025 to build up this sector and reduce its dependence on imported inputs.

Read the full report (PDF, 55 pages)

The Quid Pro Quo (QPQ) Tracker

Released October 22, 2026

Who Paid for the Data Centers

Sixteen states and Washington, 2023 to 2026

Utilities were the political payers of record, more than the technology companies that run the data centers. Dominion Energy gave $33.7 million in Virginia. PG&E gave $30.4 million in California. Both figures count corporate and PAC giving in the state filing systems.

The study reads those contributions alongside the sales-tax exemptions, gas plant approvals and cost-allocation rules that followed, and the two floor votes in Congress. Georgia Power gave Gov. Brian Kemp $1.125 million between November 2023 and June 2026. $1.0 million of it came after his May 2024 veto of a bill that would have paused the data center sales-tax exemption.

Read the study

Released July 29, 2026

The Rules Came First

Produce safety and the 2026 lettuce outbreak

Before contaminated lettuce reached consumers in 2026, the FDA had deleted its numeric standard for agricultural water. Congress had also barred the agency from enforcing its food traceability rule before July 2028.

The study sets the industry's contributions, including $3.45 million in corporate super PAC money since 2022, against its lobbying filings and the rule-making calendar. It shows how a corrupt system built up over several years. Every figure is checked against FEC and Senate lobbying records.

Read the case study

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